

CRANSTON) is now recognized for 15 minutes.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two of my assistants may have the privilege of the floor during this debate on Vietnam: Murray Flander and Ellen Frost.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, my purpose, and the purpose of other Senators participating in arranging this discussion of hostilities in Vietnam, was merely to focus the attention of the Senate and, hopefully, through that process the attention of the country, on the tragic developments in Southeast Asia.

I have done my best to insure that there will be a presentation of views from various stances supportive of present policies and the questioning of present policies in Vietnam during the course of this discussion.

The rules and procedures of the Senate as to the allocation of time to each Senator may make this presentation slightly jerky and perhaps a bit disorderly at times, but I am hopeful, as are others who hold varying and contrary views of what is occurring in Vietnam, that we will have a real presentation of the various alternatives, the various views, and the various questions that so many of us have in differing ways about Vietnam.

The first question is: Is this war really winding down? Is the administration successful in winding down the Vietnam war?

It seems to me that this war is winding up and winding sideways, to the air, the set, and to neighboring parts of Indochina, rather than winding down. It is still very much an American war.

The total number of plane losses and combat casualties has jumped to new and staggering heights. The number of helicopters and fixed-wing planes shot down over Vietnam has climbed to at least 7,419. This figure pushes the cost of lost airplanes to a shocking \$7 billion.

According to a study prepared by the Indochina Resource Center and Project Air War, one American has been shot down and either captured or listed as missing in action once every 3 days since President Nixon took office.

The number of B-52's in the area has climbed to 130, surpassing the 1968 peak. At least 20 U.S. Marine F-4 fighter-bombers have been sent from Japan. Another 20 F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers have been sent from the United States. The Air Force's 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, comprised of spotter and attack planes, will not be leaving Vietnam as planned. The total number of attack planes is now about 600.

Elsewhere, thousands more Americans still form part of the war effort in addition to those inside Vietnam. Some 45,000 air personnel fly bombing missions over Vietnam from bases outside Vietnamese borders.

In the coastal waters, the American armada is swelling toward 47,000 men on almost 50 ships. Naval strength includes two cruisers, at least a dozen de-

stroyers, and four—and soon to be six—aircraft carriers. An amphibious landing force from the 7th Fleet, comprised of a helicopter carrier and 2,000 men, has been shifted to Vietnamese waters.

The number of ships and Navy personnel now off the coasts of Vietnam is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. The number of B-52's now flying combat missions in Indochina is the highest since Lyndon Johnson left office. Hanoi and Haiphong are being subjected to American air attacks for the first time since Lyndon Johnson left office. In fact, this is the first time in the history of this increasingly futile and tragic war that those population centers have been attacked by our heavy strategic bombers.

The recent intensification of the air war over North Vietnam shows no more signs of halting the fighting in the South now than in the past. The Department of Defense has estimated that Communist forces require only 15 to 30 tons of imported material per day to maintain a moderate level of fighting in the South. This amount can be carried in 10 to 15 trucks, 75 to 150 bicycles, or on human backs.

While the air war is becoming more impersonal and remote for Americans, the same cannot be said for those on the receiving end of the bomb delivery system. Planes are still routinely armed with antipersonnel and incendiary bombs which inflict hideous suffering. Antipersonnel bombs include: Pineapple bombs, each bearing 250,000 steel pellets; Guava bombs, with each sortie releasing 400,000-500,000 ball bearing pellets; and Flechette or nail bombs, each of which contains several hundred 1-inch barbed nails capable of shredding muscles and tissues and difficult to remove.

Incendiary bombs include not just the infamous napalm, but white phosphorus and NPT as well. White phosphorus continues to burn slowly inside the body and can usually be extinguished only when it reaches the bone. Needless to say, the pain is unspeakable and totally unjustifiable. NPT, or napalm-phosphorus-thermite, is the most destructive of all and can be applied to a large area. On the ground, so-called "area denial" mines can be laid by the thousands. The Dragontooth and Gravel mines will not destroy a truck tire, but they will blow off a foot. The Spider mine or WAAPM—wide area antipersonnel mine—has eight fine wire which, when tripped, hurl ball bearing-like pellets for approximately 197 feet.

Yet what can all of this accomplish? According to the Pentagon papers, a CIA bombing study dryly concluded as early as May 1967 that "27 months of American bombing have had little effect."

There is no historical evidence that massive bombing has ever succeeded in breaking the morale of troops fighting elsewhere. A careful and scholarly study of the social impact of bomb destruction reports that—

Studies made of troop morale after news had reached them of casualties and other air-raid losses during World War II disclosed no evidence that the efficiency of troops had been substantially reduced or that desertions had increased.

This statement is from a book by Mr. Fred Ikle entitled "The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction," which was published by the University of Oklahoma Press.

Bombing North Vietnam has simply not worked. There is a slight difference in the strategic situation now, with a more massive use of troops and more concentration of forces, but bombing targets in North Vietnam certainly does not relate to the immediate events on the battlefields far from those areas.

The failure of bombing raids can be documented elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. According to figures gathered by Project Air War, 150,000 tons of bombs have been dropped on Cambodia since May 1970, but guerrillas control from 70 percent to 90 percent of the territory. In Laos, bombing undertaken since May 1964 has included a devastating 500,000 sorties dropping 1.5 million tons of bombs. And yet Communist forces control at least two-thirds of Laotian territory today.

What justification is there, then, for this heavy bombing today?

Nowadays all operations in the Indochina theater are primarily justified in the name of protection of our troops. That is what Secretary Laird said yesterday. That is what President Nixon has said in recent days.

This protection apparently is being used primarily as a legal reason and not as a strategic reason. There are questions as to what legal justifications there are now that we have repealed the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution providing for resorting to this force throughout South-east Asia.

At the current stage of the fighting, the threat posed to the vast bulk of American forces cannot possibly provide an excuse for extending the bombing to the 20th parallel. The purpose of these raids is clearly punitive, not protective.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from California yield?

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend, the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I first want to congratulate the Senator from California for bringing this matter before the Senate.

It seems to me that there is no more timely or important discussion that we could be holding at this time in the Senate than the discussion of what is now going on in Indochina, and particularly in North Vietnam. It is my understanding from watching the television that the great emphasis that is being placed on the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi is that it is done in order to protect our troops and, for that reason, is fully and thoroughly justifiable because it is protecting American lives.

I, of course, have observed the map of Vietnam a number of times. In fact, I visited Vietnam about 4 years ago and observed the Tet offensive when it was raging at its height. However, in miles, how far away would Haiphong and Hanoi be from the nearest American troops? Does the Senator have any idea of that distance?

Mr. CRANSTON. The distance is over 250 miles.

The Strategy of Failure

President Nixon's decision to turn the clock back four years by escalating the bombing of North Vietnam from its southern panhandle to the Hanoi-Haiphong area is an exercise in folly and futility. It revives a strategy tried for three years and abandoned finally by President Johnson in 1968 because it was demonstrably a failure. The mystery is why it is being tried again.

Secretary Rogers and the White House in separate statements have indicated that the bombing was meant in part as a threat that Mr. Nixon will "take whatever action is necessary" to halt the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam. The lull that has followed evidently is intended to underline this warning. Both statements ruled out the reintroduction of American ground forces into the war or, of course, the use of nuclear weapons. The threat then, directed presumably at Moscow as well as Hanoi, is that a continued Communist offensive will bring back large-scale bombing of North Vietnam as in 1965-68—extended, perhaps, to the mining or bombing of Haiphong harbor and other ports. But neither Hanoi nor Moscow is likely to be intimidated now by a threat they have already faced down.

Officials in Washington and Saigon acknowledge that the current North Vietnamese offensive is being fueled by supplies already in South Vietnam or nearby. Bombing Haiphong, the so-called "top of the funnel," they assert, is aimed at the supplies that might reach the front during the summer or later and keep the battle going then—at a time even more embarrassing politically for President Nixon. If the Administration's objective is to prevent this, it is doomed in advance to fail.

As long ago as July 1966, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency reported that sixteen months of bombing North Vietnam "had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South." Moreover, the intelligence estimate concluded that this situation was "not likely to be altered" by mining Haiphong and other harbors or adopting other military proposals then contemplated for expanding the air offensive.

A year later, after the air offensive had been expanded in most proposed ways except for hitting Haiphong harbor, Defense Secretary McNamara reported that "there continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist, or her ability to ship the necessary supplies south."

The risk of conflict with the Soviet Union and China dissuaded President Johnson from attacking Haiphong harbor. He concluded that the Communist superpowers were more likely to increase their involvement than to back down if their supply ships were sunk. The damage reported by Moscow to four of its ships last weekend, although American planes had orders to avoid Haiphong harbor, emphasizes the danger.

President Nixon may be prepared to run this risk. He may be gambling that the Soviet Union will restrain Hanoi or restrict its supply flow rather than accept a confrontation that would endanger Mr. Nixon's May 22 visit to Moscow and, with it, such other Soviet objectives as a strategic arms agreement, increased trade with the United States and Bonn's ratification of the German-Soviet treaty and the European status quo.

But a SALT agreement and détente in Europe are as much Mr. Nixon's objectives as the Kremlin's, and they are important to his re-election campaign. Is he prepared to risk them and the peace of the world by going beyond implied threats of a naval-air blockade of Haiphong—which are unlikely to intimidate Moscow—to the reality? Does he dream of turning Soviet supply ships around in the Gulf of Tonkin the way President Kennedy turned them around during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962?

One danger is that the Soviet Union may feel that Mr. Nixon is bluffing and, calling him, find that he is not. Since the Cambodian invasion of 1970, the President's aides have boasted of Mr. Nixon's "unpredictability." The stakes are too high for the nation or the Congress any longer to accept such risks.